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 1 
 WHY SUPPLY CHAIN COLLABORATION FAILS: THE SOCIO-STRUCTURAL  
VIEW OF RESISTANCE TO RELATIONAL STRATEGIES 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Supply chain collaboration—“the ability to work across organizational boundaries to build and 
manage unique value-added processes” (Fawcett et al., 2008a: 93)—has been touted as a source 
of differential firm performance (e.g., Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Flynn et al., 2010; Swink 
and Schoenherr, 2015). When the benefits of working collaboratively outweigh its costs 
(Terjesen et al., 2012), firms may seek to combine complementary capabilities to create value 
that they could not achieve independently (Barratt, 2004; Daugherty et al., 2006; Allred et al., 
2011). The view that firms collaborate to obtain supernormal “relational rents” is referred to as 
the Relational View (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Despite the widely hyped benefits obtained by 
relational exemplars like Honda and Toyota, few firms have demonstrated a consistent ability to 
collaborate in a way that leads to distinctive advantage (Daugherty et al., 2006; Jacobides, 2006; 
Nyaga et al., 2010).  
 Further, the cost of collaboration failures asserts a need to investigate why effective 
supply chain collaboration is so rare. Hendricks and Singhal, for instance, conducted a series of 
event studies to quantify the operational and stock price effects of supply chain glitches. Firms 
that experience and announce disruptions report on average 6.92% lower sales growth, 10.66% 
higher growth in cost, and 13.88% higher growth in inventories (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005). 
Hendricks and Singhal (2008: 787) conclude,  
The fact that disruptions caused by external sources (supplier and customers) experienced 
a higher penalty suggests that these problems can be more expensive and time consuming 
for the firm to fix. This may be due to the firm’s limited power to change their external 
partners’ operations to solve the problems. This further underscores the need to form 
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 2 
close and collaborative relationships with the various links in the supply chain. A firm 
must make sure that its supply chain partners see the value of working together. 
 
 Assessing why firms fail to execute collaboration strategies is therefore timely. Indeed, it 
has been almost twenty years since Dyer and Singh (1998: 676) said, “Given the poor track 
record of many alliances, researchers might examine, in detail, the factors that impede the 
realization of relational rents.” Although diverse explanations for collaboration failures have 
been proposed (e.g., Park and Unsung, 2001; Fawcett et al., 2008b), few empirical studies delve 
into the details and dynamics of relational resistors. By conducting a quasi-longitudinal inductive 
study of firm’s collaborations strategies to identify and classify factors that hinder collaboration, 
our research redresses this deficiency, responding to Dyer and Singh’s unanswered call for deep 
insight into the factors that impede relational rents. We contribute to the study of relational 
strategies in two ways. First, we provide a typology of relational resistors. Second, we propose a 
model that shows how sociological and structural forces interact to destabilize collaboration and 
impede the growth of relational skills.  
 
2. Theoretical Development: Resistance to Supply Chain Collaboration 
Park and Ungsun’s (2001) observation that what actually happens when firms pursue relational 
rents often departs from what managers seek to achieve reiterates the need to deeply understand 
the forces that hinder relational strategies. Several streams of literature inform the collaboration 
challenge. Each stream’s relevance derives from insight provided into why firms struggle with 
the process of organizing network resources to create distinctive value (Barreto, 2010). As 
relational rents accrue from redefined roles and reconfigured resources among firms, literature 
related to organizational transformation is particularly pertinent.  
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 3 
 Within the organizational transformation literature, social interaction (Staw et al., 1981) 
and organizational structure (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) are sources of relational resistance. 
Inter-firm rivalry, for instance, arises from mixed incentives, which create tension between doing 
what is best for the alliance’s interests and doing what is best for firm’s individual interests (Das 
and Teng, 2000; Khanna et al, 1998). Also, the structure-induced complexity that emerges from 
functional and firm-centric orientations introduces misalignment among decision makers and 
decreases visibility regarding links between decisions and outcomes, exacerbating existent 
conflicting motives (Gerwin, 2004; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Fawcett et al., 2012a).  
 To date, various relational resistors have been identified, but the discussion is ad hoc and 
fragmented. The literature fails to explain why so few relational exemplars—beyond archetypes 
like Honda and Toyota—have emerged or why effective inter-organizational collaboration is so 
difficult.  
 
2.1 Organizational Transformation 
For most of the twentieth century, strategists employed a transactional approach to buyer-
supplier relationships (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979). The goal was twofold: leverage scale 
economies and mitigate risks. By the 1980s, the success of Japanese manufacturers led decision 
makers to reassess relationships among organizations (Schonberger, 1986; Womack et al., 1990). 
Analysts perceived that much of the advantage gained by companies like Honda and Toyota 
came from tightly coupled buyer/supplier relationships, which enhanced learning, drove down 
costs, and improved quality (Fawcett and Birou, 1993; Nelson et al., 1998; Liker and Choi, 
2004). As managers sought to emulate the relational approach, they discovered that the 
organizational structure and routines required to minimize costs are quite different from those 
needed to effectively govern collaboration strategies (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Yet, unable to 
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collaborate well, many firms reverted back to more traditional relationships (Worthen et al, 
2009).  
 Force field theory explains why a firm’s transition from a transactional approach to a 
relational view is so difficult (Lewin, 1951). Force field theory submits that organizations persist 
in a steady state until an external force dictates change. Motivated by this driving force, the firm 
enters a transition phase during which adaptation is pursued. Resisting forces, however, 
counterbalance change. Zand and Sorensen (1975) found that if resisting forces are stronger than 
driving forces, organizations persist in previous behaviors. In our context, transactional relations 
are the steady state and a desire for relational rents in a threatening market is the force driving 
collaboration. The nature of the resisting forces and how they interact to hinder the collaboration 
needed to instill a relational capability is not well understood (Dent and Goldberg, 1999). 
 
2.3 Sociological Resistance 
Forces that resist change—e.g., policies, processes, and people—pervade value co-creation 
relationships (Dent and Goldberg, 1999; Kotter, 1995). Threat-rigidity theory, for instance, 
emphasizes sociological resistors, maintaining that individuals react to threatening events in a 
maladaptive manner (Staw et al., 1981). When faced with the threat of change, psychological 
anxiety limits an individual’s ability to acquire and process information. A rigid, often feeble 
response emerges (Moon and Conlon, 2002). As a bottom-up approach, threat-rigidity theory 
views the individual as the input and organizational effectiveness as an output. Individual 
decision makers hinder organizational change. Hambrick et al. (2001) applied threat-rigidity 
theory to alliances, noting that partners fail to cooperate because dysfunctions among decision 
makers lead to conflict, diminishing alliance performance. 
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 Specifically, collaboration exposes decision makers to vulnerability. They are therefore 
unwilling to make investments and take risks needed to create a positive, collaborative exchange 
environment (e.g., McCarter and Northcraft, 2007; Villena et al., 2009; Day et al., 2013). 
Partner’s non-collaborative behavior manifests itself in two ways.  
1. In exchange relationships, value is created when at least one partner makes an initial 
investment (Zeng and Chen, 2003). Yet, the hope that other partners will invest, generating 
gains for all alliance members, tempts each participant to forego investments. But, if no one 
invests, collaborative benefits do not emerge. Individual, short-run rationality leads to 
collective, long-term irrationality (Messick and Brewer, 1983).  
2. Managers often fear that one or more partners will use power to expropriate nascent benefits, 
creating risk. Uncertainty constrains managers’ ability to motivate relationship formation and 
sustain long-term interactions (Gulati and Kletter, 2005; Lavie, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; 
Fawcett et al., 2012b; Perez and Cambar-Fierro, 2015).  
 
Although the literature identifies the threat of non-cooperation as a source of relational 
resistance, it does not provide deep insight into the mechanisms through which such behaviors 
are manifest or managed.  
 
2.4 Structural Resistance 
Structural-inertia theory, by contrast, highlights the change-inhibiting nature of structural 
elements (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). As a top-down, firm-level approach, structural-inertia 
theory posits that structural aspects of the organization—e.g., routines, rules, and roles—restrict 
individuals from adapting to external threats (Barnett and Carroll, 1995). Long-standing 
structures are especially resistant to change (Barron et al., 1994). Greve et al.’s (2010) research 
on alliances in the ocean-liner industry found that previous alliance relationships and ship size 
acted as resisting forces to increase a partner’s prospect of retreating from a shipping alliance.  
 Specifically, because organizations are structured to promote task mastery and 
specialization, existing structured routines are likely to impede collaboration (Coase, 1937; 
Anderson, 1982; Koufteros et al., 2010). Hiring, training, work rules, and metrics all inculcate 
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“specialists” who pursue their own goals—often to the exclusion of holistic performance. Goal 
incongruence drives both inter-functional and inter-organizational conflict, leading to frequent 
disagreement, frustration, and diminished performance (e.g., Ruekert, and Walker, 1987; Duarte 
and Davies, 2003; Allred et al., 2011). Thomas (1992, p. 653) noted that conflict “begins when 
one party perceives that the other has negatively affected, or is about to negatively affect, 
something that he or she cares about.” As managers operate within distinct reporting structures, 
non-collaborative behavior is exacerbated (Dyer and Song, 1997; Fawcett et al., 2008c). Over 
time, structure-induced conflict is an impediment to relational advantage (Duarte and Davies, 
2003; Fawcett et al., 2012b).  
 To summarize, organizational transformation sets the stage and social interaction and 
organizational structure inform the cast of characters that keep organizations from working 
together to achieve a relational advantage. Extant literature, however, does not fully identify and 
classify what Dyer and Singh (1998: 676) called, “the factors that impede the realization of 
relational rents.” Nor does existing theory explain how these resistors interact to undermine 
collaboration strategies. Managers thus continue to struggle to remediate collaborative failures. 
As diagnosis precedes prescription (Sutton and Staw, 1995), we seek to redress these 
deficiencies by enriching theory on a socio-structural view of resistance to relational advantage.  
 
3. Research Methods 
Although the relational view had been articulated as a vital strategic theory, it was evident as we 
initiated our study that issues regarding relational advantage were complex and not well 
understood. Three steps grounded the research:  
1. We conducted an extensive key word literature search via ABI Inform and ProQuest 
databases. Because the literature had poorly defined and interchangeably used relational 
concepts, we searched the words “supply chain” in combination with “integration,” 
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“coordination,” and “collaboration” to assure a comprehensive review. The 159 articles 
identified were used to design the interview guide. Even now, scholars acknowledge that 
conceptualization and theorization related to these relational concepts remain imprecise and 
underdeveloped (e.g., Fawcett et al., 2014; Autry et al., 2014; Knemeyer and Fawcett, 2015). 
2. We conducted informal managerial interviews to refine the guide and ensure relevance.  
3. We assembled an advisory board of managers and academics to give feedback on the 
research process.  
 
 This pre-field work also provided context to interpret our findings. Because our interest 
was in the struggle managers encounter over time as they seek to build a relational capability, we 
repeated the study after six years—that is, we employed a quasi-longitudinal method. This time 
interval was long enough to yield insight into process questions regarding how and why 
relational resistors emerge and/or persist, impeding relational strategies.  
 
3.1 Sample and Context 
We employed a multi-case, interview methodology to explore the dynamics of resistance to 
relational strategies (Yin, 1981; McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993). Interviews are robust as they 
enable managers to elaborate on multi-faceted challenges they encounter as they build deep 
functional skills while simultaneously promoting relational capabilities (Eisenhardt, 1991). Our 
unit of analysis was companies’ supply chain collaboration strategies/capabilities. To yield 
meaningful results, we selected extreme cases—that is, companies that had publically committed 
to compete via collaborative supply chain strategies. We specifically selected companies that 
were either 1) identified in the trade press as relational exemplars or 2) on the programs of 
professional associations to share the results of their collaboration initiatives. Each company was 
involved in one or more collaborative initiatives at the time of the interviews. Extreme cases 
amplify (i.e., better define and expose) the dynamics under investigation to help build theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Pratt et al., 2006). Multiple cases enable replication logic, allowing 
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researchers to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from each case (Yin, 1981; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). 
 Given the focus on understanding why collaboration strategies fail to deliver desired 
results, we conducted interviews across multiple channel positions. Retailers, finished-goods 
assemblers, direct materials suppliers, and service providers possess the complementary 
capabilities that collaboration strategies are designed to bring together. The multi-channel 
approach enabled us to evaluate strategic dimensions derived from the literature, which were 
perceived to influence collaboration: customer contact, resource access, and idiosyncratic know-
how. The literature viewed these factors as sources of power and thus key influencers of 
relational dynamics, including rivalry and opportunism. Importantly—and contrary to a priori 
expectations—no meaningful differences in relational resistors and dynamics were identified 
across the channel positions.  
 The actual interviews were conducted on site across the U.S. and in Europe. Managers at 
49 companies were interviewed in Period 1. For Period 2, managers at 57 companies were 
interviewed. Fifteen companies participated in both rounds of interviews, providing a control in 
that their status and behavior was compared to the other companies in each time period. No 
substantial differences were observed between these 15 companies and their contemporaries. 
Table 1 shows essential demographics for the interviewed companies. By design, the interviewed 
companies in the two panels possess similar characteristics. The findings from the Period 1 
interviews led us to include several smaller firms in Period 2.  
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
 Once a company agreed to participate, we provided an overview of the research 
objectives and a copy of the interview protocol (Spradley, 1979). The protocol was populated 
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with open-ended questions to 1) allow managers to describe events and processes, 2) assure 
comparability of findings, and 3) provide insight into unique practices that emerged during the 
interviews. The typical interview lasted 2 to 4 hours and involved senior supply chain managers 
who had responsibility for collaborative initiatives. Because collaboration crosses functional 
boundaries, the contact manager often invited IT managers, logisticians, new product managers, 
purchasers, and project leaders to participate in the interviews. Multiple informants mitigate 
subject biases and provide nuanced insights into complex phenomena like resistance to 
collaborative transformation (Miller et al., 1997; Schwenk, 1985). 
 In addition to extensive interview notes, secondary sources such as business case 
analyses, news releases, process documentation, program descriptions, and scorecards were 
gathered. These materials were used to 1) create rich and reliable structured case write-ups 
(Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004) and 2) avoid “data asphyxiation” from the large amounts of 
data (Pettigrew, 1990). An iterative discussion-based process was used to compare notes on 
process and content and to improve research reliability and validity (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
 Each case write-up was used for both within-case and cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Ellram, 1996). First, each case was viewed as a “stand-alone entity” to identify and 
describe the resistors encountered and how they influenced behavior. Although we noticed 
similarities and differences among the cases, to maintain the independence of the replication 
logic, we refrained from further analysis until we had completed the interviews. Second, after we 
completed all of the write-ups, we followed the inductive process and searched across the cases 
for emerging themes. Our goal was to identify and match patterns to develop a more robust and 
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complete theoretical picture (Eisenhardt, 1991; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). We pursued a 
three-step iterative evaluation process to obtain the best interpretation of the interviews. 
1. Using the literature as background, we pursued an iterative, open-coding process—i.e., we 
traveled back and forth among the case write-ups, the literature, and emerging constructs. As 
we identified common statements, we formed provisional categories and first-order codes, 
which we tracked using a spreadsheet.  
2.  The three-person analysis team used a process of individual coding, collaborative discussion, 
and concurring to derive theoretical meaning from the cases. The team consisted of one of 
the original interviewers as well as two new researchers. The new researchers were brought 
in to avoid data processing bias (Pagell and Wu, 2009). We repeated this process for every 
ten cases until all of the cases were coded. As new concepts were discovered, the researchers 
returned to the previously coded cases to look for evidence of newly identified phenomena.  
3. Because the provisional categories were tightly defined, their number expanded greatly. To 
focus our findings on the most frequently observed and problematic resistors, we employed 
two decision rules as part of the axial coding process. First, we consolidated narrow, but 
closely related codes into broader, more theoretical categories. Second, we deleted 
phenomena that were encountered in fewer than 10% of the companies (Pratt, 2008).  
 
 The analysis process lasted four months and yielded Figure 1: An overview of the data 
structure. As we continued to evaluate the cross-case patterns and apply what we were learning 
to individual case studies, we identified both sociological and structural resistors. More 
importantly, we noted a self-reinforcing interaction among the various resistors. This interplay 
builds a “wall of resistance” to high-level collaboration. The co-mingled, reinforcing nature of 
the diverse resistors helps explain the challenge companies encounter as they seek to employ 
collaboration strategies to achieve relational rents (e.g., Cousins and Menguc, 2006; Das et al., 
2006; Wong et al., 2011; Fawcett et al., 2012a; Jin et al., 2013; Sweeney et al., 2015). We 
continue by classifying specific resistors and proposing a socio-structural theoretical model of 
resistance to collaboration.  
*** Figure 1: Overview of Data Structure *** 
 
 
4. Findings and Discussion: Understanding the Wall of Resistance 
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A poignant theme across time periods was that managers perceived relational advantage as 
highly valued but difficult to achieve. Most companies exhibited only modest progress—
primarily via investments in information technology—toward more collaborative behavior over 
the previous six years. Managers noted that a variety of resistors stood in the way of distinctive 
collaboration (see Table 2). Relational advantage among organizations remained “the goal rather 
than the reality.”  
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
 As we sought to understand the nature of relational resistance, two categorization 
dimensions emerged from the analysis (see Figure 2):  
• Origin—that is, whether the resistor is embedded at the firm or individual level. 
• Timing—that is, whether firms have recognized the resistor over time or only more recently.  
Insight into why origin informs classification derives from the organizational transformation 
literature. Specifically, top-down theories view resistance to change as coming from structure 
whereas bottom-up theories maintain that change is stunted at the human level. This top-down 
versus bottom-up pattern matched what we were discovering in the interviews. We found that 
both structural resistors (e.g., cross-functional conflict and misaligned goals) and sociological 
resistors (e.g., low trust, and unwillingness to share information) actively infused every case 
study, hindering the development of relational advantage.  
*** Figure 2: Taxonomy of Relational Resistors *** 
 
 As we compared findings between the two time periods, we found managers in Period 2 
were still frustrated with the many of the same resistors—e.g., structural conflict, misaligned 
metrics, low trust, and poor information sharing—that their Period 1 counterparts had identified. 
More importantly, they described years of unsuccessful efforts to mitigate these resistors. We 
labeled these embedded, persistent resistors as entrenched resistors. Similarly, we found that 
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some resistors that were infrequently mentioned in Period 1—e.g., leadership, alliance know-
how, and finding employees with collaborative skills—had moved into managers’ view (mention 
rates had increased to 30% or more). We called these resistors emerging resistors. Combining 
these two classification dimensions yielded four distinct types of relational resistors—Structural 
Resistors, Sociological Resistors, Organizational Routines, and Individual Skills—that reinforce 
each other to freeze companies in non-collaborative strategies.  
 
4.1 The Nature and Influence of Structural Resistors 
For rational reasons, structural resistors are embedded within organizational design. For 
example, companies exist as organizational forms distinct from market mechanisms to achieve 
economies of scale and minimize transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979). Firms are 
designed functionally to build the deep skills needed to create economic value (Anderson, 1982). 
However, interviewed managers repeatedly described how tension within and between firms 
created by this quest for efficiency impedes the emergence of collaborative mechanisms and 
mindsets. One manager expressed the consensus feeling, saying, “Too many managers are 
functionally obsessed.” 
4.1.1 Territoriality. Managers described “siloed” organizations that lead managers to “see 
things through their own little windows” and to “devalue colleagues’ contributions.” One 
elaborated, “Each one . . . focuses on its own little ‘garden’ and forgets that there are other 
gardens that make up the whole.” Another fretted, “We have good people who do not accept that 
others do great work.” Managers are thus “concerned that others may be touching their piece of 
the supply chain puzzle.” They are “worried about losing control of their own business unit’s 
performance” and “feel no need to collaborate.” Territoriality is systemic and enduring: “Once 
you create turf, it is tough to take it away. That guy isn’t going to give his power up!”  
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Territoriality’s anti-collaborative behavior is the most prevalent and problematic resistor. 
Exchange partners are often unduly preoccupied with protecting local, immediate goals and 
initiatives at the expense of value co-creation. One manager described the reluctance of territorial 
colleagues to participate in meaningful collaboration, noting, “People are more concerned about 
who will get the glory or the blame rather than evaluate whether or not a decision will benefit the 
entire company.” Structure that promotes territoriality cripples collaboration. 
4.1.2 Strategic Misalignment. Territoriality’s reach is expansive, instilling non-aligned metrics. 
A manager stated, “Metrics stand in the way of improved internal and supply chain collaboration. 
Each group has its own metrics, so each group does its own thing.” Another noted, “Conflicting 
objectives are supported by performance measures. Counterproductive behavior is incented.” 
Local measures enable managers to justify non-collaborative behavior, reasoning that if they were 
supposed to work more collaboratively, surely the metrics would communicate and reinforce that 
goal. Performing to metric convinces managers they are doing exactly what they should be doing.  
 Managers were adamant regarding the negative influence of cost-driven metrics on 
relationship quality. One maintained that “excessive emphasis on short-term costs on the supply 
side” imposes a huge disincentive to upstream collaboration with suppliers. One manager noted, 
“We are too finance oriented. The result is a short-run mentality. Keeping our eyes on long-term 
goals is difficult.” Another manager queried, “Everything is price driven, but at what overall 
cost?” Others informed the tradeoff, saying,  
• “We still source for costs instead of sourcing for capabilities”  
• “There is too much emphasis on costs, costs, costs. Measurements do not promote 
collaboration or creativity.”  
• “It all comes down to price. There was a time when relationships meant something, not 
anymore.”  
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Poorly aligned goals and metrics emphasize short-term results, undermining relationship quality. 
Just as territoriality feeds misalignment, misalignment buttresses territoriality. Managers 
describe a conundrum where efforts to remove either resistor—in isolation—seldom succeed. 
4.1.3 Poor Systems Connectivity. Technology investments are often defensive. That is, 
managers say they are “needed to stay in the game.” In Period 1, we found two companies that 
had developed Internet interfaces to share information on historical sales, real-time inventory 
status, and rolling production forecasts with suppliers. By Period 2, such capabilities had become 
common. Managers explained that since competitors were implementing the latest technologies, 
including ERP and RFID, investments were needed to avoid fighting today’s competitive battles 
with yesterday’s technology. Consistent, substantial investment means that connectivity is one 
structural resistor where mitigation efforts over time have delivered tangible benefits. 
 Yet, connectivity gains were described as meager when compared to those promised in 
the companies’ business case analyses. The connectivity challenge is rooted in the complexity 
that emerges from territoriality and strategic misalignment. For instance, alliance partners are 
often unable to connect. Typical comments include, “IT systems at certain links in the chain are 
weak. . . . We run into suppliers or customers that have not invested in needed technology,” and 
“Some [partners] are missing the key technologies to enable information sharing.” One manager 
succinctly summarized: “Systems are the biggest barrier. Not everyone has the capability to 
seamlessly communicate.” When partners are unable to support relational goals because they 
lack connectivity, enthusiasm for the collaborative strategy dissipates.  
 Overall, traditional structures and their managerial artifacts engender territoriality, focus 
attention on local optimums, and increase complexity, magnifying resistance to collaboration. 
The interplay among structural resistors is what entrenches them and demotivates managers from 
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expending resources, making sacrifices, or taking risks to design and execute collaboration 
strategies across organizational boundaries.  
 
4.2 The Nature and Influence of Sociological Resistors 
Although collaboration strategies provide prospects for distinctive competencies (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Stalk et al., 1992), they make managers dependent on others to pool resources and 
to make collaborative decisions. Interdependency increases risk. Managers told us that this risk 
elicits strong resistance as managers react to the vulnerability and stress that attend collaboration. 
This finding confirms research that argues people are more “concerned about the risk of change 
than about the risk of failing to change” and consequently choose to “preserve current systems 
and beliefs” (Baron et al., 2006: 126). Through the interviews, we identified three sociological 
resistors that interact to thwart collaboration strategies.  
4.2.1 Low Trust. Although they observed that trust underlies collaboration, most managers 
noted that meager trust exists—even in key relationships. Managers expressed reservations not 
just about the existence of trust but also regarding the behaviors that build it. For example, 
managers emphasized how asymmetrical power leads to a “what-have-you-done-for-me-lately” 
mindset that impedes trust and teamwork. The following stories illustrate this reality. 
1. During a supplier visit, the supply manager described a recent negotiation with a long-time 
customer. The customer had invited several suppliers to its corporate headquarters to discuss 
a major bid. Each supplier was assigned to a room where the negotiations were carried out in 
an iterative, serial fashion. The buying organization’s purchasing team proceeded to go from 
room to room talking about its need to reach its “target cost.” During each session, hints were 
given regarding lower prices obtained from rival suppliers. The buyer was engaged in a face-
to-face reverse auction, pitting suppliers against each other in real time. 
2. During visits to each side of a dyad involved in the research, we observed that there are often 
two distinct sides to a story. Buyer managers expressed pride in their willingness to share 
risks and rewards to build strong supply relationships. The supplier’s response to our 
question about risk and reward sharing was simple: “Yes, they know very well how to share 
risks and rewards. They keep all of the rewards and pass all of the risks on to us.”  
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 Managers related that experience has taught them that the answer to the question, “Can 
we really trust someone outside our firm to do what is best for our company?” is “No!” One 
manager said simply, “It is tough to find companies that will follow through on commitments.” 
Most managers related that asymmetrical power not only motivates opportunistic behavior but 
also magnifies feelings of vulnerability. Managers frequently noted, “It is too easy to abuse 
power,” or “It all comes down to power—at the end of the day, power rules.” A manager from a 
large consumer products company commented that his firm’s buyers openly admit to smaller, 
weaker suppliers that, “It sucks to be you.” Managers at several suppliers noted, “When a buyer 
says, ‘We need to squeeze costs out of the process,’ they really mean they plan to squeeze the 
margin out of us.” One manager summarized that a super-ordinate emphasis on short-term 
financial goals undermines trust and collaboration: “If the goal is only to save money, you can’t 
build trust.” Managers thus confirmed that few companies know how to appropriately build 
trust—a reality that hinders open communication and proactive change (Day et al., 2013; 
Fawcett et al., 2012a; Villena et al., 2011).  
4.2.2 Information Hoarding. Managers noted that an unwillingness to share information 
hinders effective collaboration. Surprisingly, managers often observed that information hoarding 
is as prevalent across functions within their organization as with external partners. One manager 
made the point emphatically, saying, “It is easier to get information from suppliers than from 
other groups within our firm.” This reality reiterates the power of territoriality, foreshadowing 
the interconnectedness of structural and sociological resistors.  
 Similarly, as connectivity has improved, managers have come to realize that being 
connected is not the same as being collaborative. Specifically, most leading companies rely on 
enhanced Internet-based connectivity to share tactical, order-related information on a real-time, 
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rolling-horizon basis. Few, however, are willing to share strategic information regarding market 
entry, product development, and technology roadmaps. Inadequate trust motivates companies to 
retain this “proprietary” information. Yet, managers argued that they need this strategic 
information to justify the investments required to support key customers’ strategic initiatives. 
Understanding future needs early is critical to developing capabilities as well as investing in 
capacity over time rather than as a last-minute response.  
4.2.3 Opposition to Change. To achieve relational advantage, managers must adopt new 
approaches and build new skills. For instance, managers know how to employ power to achieve 
short-term goals, but as noted above, they lack the skills to build trust and improve relationship 
quality. Such skill deficits led managers to emphasize that people—in their firms and across 
supply relationships—view collaboration apprehensively, arguing against change. Managers 
complained colleagues hold firmly to old, non-collaborative ways of doing business, claiming,  
•  “It’s worked! Why should we change now?”  
• “That’s the way we’ve always done it.”  
• “Your argument makes sense, but we’re different!”  
 The language and tone of managers throughout the interviews underscore that managers 
do more than avoid collaborative change—they oppose it. As one manager noted, “Management 
is not at all open to change or new ideas.” Another spoke of the consequence, saying, 
“Companies are afraid to change. They resist leaving their own little comfort zones at all costs. 
This is one of the top three reasons companies fail.” One was more creative, noting, “Some 
people need to get their butts kicked by the competition before they will make the needed 
changes.” Ultimately, as one manager related, “Top management really does not understand the 
need for change and collaboration.” Ironically, even as managers admitted that their firms are not 
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adept at managing collaborative change, they noted that the marketplace is changing at an 
unprecedented pace, threatening their firms’ long-term survivability.   
 In summary, we found low trust, information hoarding, and opposition to change 
seldom—if ever—exist in isolation. The willingness to share sensitive strategic information 
depends on relationship trust. Similarly, without trust, people are unwilling to change behavior. 
Sociological resistors thus disguise and compound one another. Managers may diligently push 
open information sharing, but fail to invest in greater trust. When communication failures persist, 
people blame technology. More IT investment often ensues, but it too fails since the root cause—
i.e., low trust and information hoarding—is not addressed. This illustrates how the collaboration 
challenge is exacerbated as structural and sociological resistors interact. Indeed, territoriality and 
myopic measures magnify opposition to change, undermine trust, and limit information sharing. 
The unique, inimitable value encouraged by the relational view cannot emerge as these 
entrenched sociological and structural resistors comingle to stifle collaboration.  
 
4.3 Inadequate Organizational Routines as Resistors  
Dyer and Singh (1998: 668) identified organizational routines as a source of relational rent: 
“Although complementarity of strategic resources creates the potential for relational rents, the 
rents can only be realized if the firms have systems and cultures that are compatible enough to 
facilitate coordinated action.” The interviews revealed that firms have not developed three 
routines that are essential to identify and integrate resources across organizational boundaries.  
4.3.1 Relationship Intensity. The Period 1 interviews revealed that few firms had learned to 
articulate and manage to the principle that “not all relationships are created equal.” Managers 
explained that their firms had been “caught up in the collaboration hype.” They had invested 
scarce resources in relationships that offered no unique value co-creation potential. The resulting 
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poor return on investment tarnished the reputation of collaboration strategies. By Period 2, 
managers discussed the challenge of rebooting collaboration strategies only to discover that their 
firm’s lacked the routines to manage relationship intensity. Managers explained that their firms 
had not developed the skills to identify the right partners and then to build the right relationships 
with them. Several specific relationship-development skills were identified.  
1. Ability to view suppliers as a source of advantage. A company’s attitude toward suppliers 
influences collaboration strategy. One manager explained the problem, a symptom, and its 
effect, saying, “Top management sees suppliers as sort of second-class. We aggressively use 
charge tags for mistakes. This really drives our suppliers nuts.”  
2. Ability to assess value co-creation potential. Managers emphasized that firms must be able to 
assess value creation potential. One manager shared a common experience, “Most of our 
vendors lack the sophistication and capabilities to collaborate effectively. Many lack the 
ability to fulfill a promise. Many also lack the capitalization to invest in improvement 
initiatives.” Another related the consequence of failing to build collaboration assessment 
routines: “we waste time trying to collaborate where little value can be created.” 
3. Ability to assess partner collaboration capability. Even when a firm identifies strong value 
co-creation opportunities, partners may not be willing or able to collaborate. One manager 
observed, “We have no collaborative relationships with customers. They tell us, ‘I don’t see a 
need to collaborate, so why should we talk?’” Another manager concurred, saying, “It is a 
cultural failure at many customers—they are not willing to collaborate.” He then offered 
some advice, “You have to show them why and how. Compelling facts are a must.”  
4. Ability to dedicate time to collaboration strategies. A common theme was that managers are 
too consumed with tactical decision-making and putting out day-to-day fires to invest in 
strategic relationships. One manager summarized the challenge, saying, “We are too busy to 
collaborate and share ideas.”  
5. Ability to share benefits mutually. Managers pointed out that if an “imbalance in benefits 
exists, a relationship is not sustainable.”  
 
 One manager summarized the state of relationship building, saying, “We don’t know how 
to work together!” Managers pointed out that many “strategic” alliances emerged from a desire 
to manage volume and costs rather than from the recognition that a closer relationship could 
drive strategic growth. Ultimately, many firms have yet to inculcate a culture of collaboration, 
poisoning the soil from which value co-creation grows.  
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4.3.2 Process Integration. Managers made it clear that value co-creation requires active process 
integration. To comingle complementary competencies, each entity and each individual must 
perform assigned value-added roles well. In Period 1, companies were beginning to experiment 
with re-imagined roles and responsibilities. By Period 2, managers were frequently asking “What 
if?” But managers noted that accepting new roles was still problematic, saying: 
• “We struggle with the question: Who really owns the responsibility? Marketing? The 
Development Organization? or the Global Business Unit?”  
• “We are constantly arguing with other managers over revenue streams and PandL 
responsibilities.” 
• “We are struggling with the loss of power and to adapt to changed roles and responsibilities.”  
 
 The failure to address these issues causes tension and reluctance to collaborate. At one 
firm, a purchasing manager complained, “Finance keeps entering the negotiations late—after we 
have already negotiated the relationship—and insists on changing items such as payment terms 
or funding for new initiatives.” Such behavior injures internal and external relationships. One 
manager described the dilemma, saying, “It is very difficult to get everyone on board and to 
come to a consensus on how we should move forward, especially with respect to standardized 
processes.” As one manager concluded, much of the role-redefinition challenge lies in the details 
of process integration: “It is not just passing the baton from firm to firm, but we must consider 
how to hold the baton so the receiving firm gets it in a way that supports their strength.”  
4.3.3 Complexity Management. Almost twice as many managers decried network complexity 
in Period 2 as in Period 1. Many referred to complexity as the 21
st
-century supply chain 
challenge. They complain that 1) they “have no visibility into the details,” 2) they must deal with 
“forecasts that are garbage” and are “not very good at looking too far down the road and ‘crystal 
balling’ the future,” and 3) they “lack the resources and discipline to manage complexity.” They 
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noted that ambiguity, confusion, and higher costs result from complexity and described four 
issues (two causal; two capability oriented) that make complexity a “nightmare to manage.”  
1. Global value networks are inherently complex. Managing a global network to turn worldwide 
resources into products / services global customers expect means managers must make 
myriad daily decisions across 1) many dispersed manufacturing and distribution facilities, 2) 
thousands of stock-keeping units, 3) thousands of materials suppliers and tens of thousands 
second- or third-tier suppliers, 4) hundreds of customer relationships, and 5) tangled logistics 
systems. In a global setting, the decision process is complicated by culture, language, 
regulatory, political, and infrastructure differences. 
2. Complexity is often driven across boundaries. Managers do not own the costs associated with 
complexity. They thus make decisions that increase it. For instance, marketing’s desire for 
added SKUs creates production disruptions and increases inventory costs. Likewise, a 
customer’s request for faster delivery may necessitate dispersed inventories.  
3. Not all complexity is bad, but managers struggle to differentiate between needed and 
excessive complexity. Some complexity—like a backup supplier or another stocking point—
is needed to provide customer value no one else provides. As consequences, good and bad, 
occur across boundaries and over time, evaluating complexity’s effects is difficult. 
4.  Rationalization efforts are initiated prematurely. Pressure to reduce costs via simplification 
leads companies to rationalize before they understand network dynamics and associated 
tradeoffs. Such efforts lead to unintended costs and/or service disruptions.  
 
 Managers note that because complexity is a mix of external stimulus and internal sub-
optimization, establishing effective routines to deal with complexity is difficult. Managers 
struggle to select the right actors, place them in appropriate roles, and provide the direction so 
they can perform together—delivering value even when the unexpected happens. Hampered by 
entrenched sociological and structural resistors, companies are unable to cultivate the systems 
thinking, holistic analysis, and relational influence needed to proactively manage complexity.  
 To summarize, the absence of any of these routines—i.e., relationship intensity, process 
integration, or complexity—makes mitigating the negative influence of the others difficult. For 
instance, the complexity of global value networks exacerbates the relationship-intensity and 
process-integration challenges. Companies need all three routines to reassess supply chain 
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partners and reconfigure key relationships and the value-added processes needed to achieve 
relational advantage.  
 
4.4 Inadequate Individual Skills as Resistors 
For organizational routines to foster collaboration strategies, decision makers must possess 
collaborative mindsets and skill sets. Threat-rigidity theory, however, warns that if managers do 
not possess the skills needed to create a positive exchange environment, their sense of 
vulnerability will lead them to resist collaboration (McCarter and Northcraft, 2007). The 
interviews revealed that this reaction to a skill deficit is a real concern. Managers describe how 
existing cultures and structures fuel functional rather than process thinking and autocratic 
decision-making over collaborative effort, seriously impeding relational advantage.  
4.4.1 Leadership Deficit. Managers identified leadership deficiencies twice as often in Period 2 
as in Period 1, making a lack of leadership the 3
rd
 most prevalent resistor. Managers explained 
that only senior executives possess the power to redress entrenched socio-structural resistors and 
then lamented:  
• “The lack of managerial commitment to collaboration is a major barrier.” 
• “We need commitment at the top management level.” 
• “Our last CEO was not interested in supply chain collaboration, we could not do anything, 
we could not succeed.” 
 
Absent executives who set the tone, commit resources, and promote appropriate risk-taking, 
collaboration initiatives fail. Even if some managers grasp collaboration’s potential, the 
conviction is not held widely enough to engender inimitable joint action. One manager noted, 
“We lack the collaborative mindset, the understanding, and know-how. We are still stuck in the 
old school.” Another pointed out, “Our leadership team is not modeling correct behaviors.”  
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 A focal point for managers’ criticism of leadership was leaders’ incessant drive to cut 
costs—a behavior that can undermine collaboration. One manager explained,  
Everything is price driven, but at what overall cost? How often does a plant get shut 
down because of late, low-cost shipments? How much extra inventory is held to 
compensate for late shipments? How much airfreight is used to compensate for late 
shipments? How much demurrage is paid? Most managers don’t know what the overall 
impact of their “low-price” decision is! We are constantly bombarded by mandates from 
top management to “CUT COSTS!” It is easier to take short-term costs out while 
increasing longer-term costs. 
 
Managers noted that collaboration requires upfront dedication of scarce resources, but promises 
delayed, often uncertain, returns. In such a setting, an unrelenting drive to lower costs chases 
collaboration out of many strategic discussions. One manager emphasized this point, saying, 
“Senior management is unwilling to take the risks associated with uncertainty.” Managers caught 
in a cost-cutting culture have neither the time nor the incentive to identify and promote difficult 
collaboration initiatives.  
4.4.2 Collaborative Skill Gap. The lack of collaboration vision has a trickle-down effect on the 
entire workforce. By Period 2, many managers shared a common story. As they gained 
experience with collaboration strategies, they realized their management teams lacked critical 
skills. Managers communicated this as follows: 
• “As the work changes, we will require new talent. We don’t have this talent today.” 
• “Employee development is a real challenge.” 
• “Perhaps the most difficult issue is to find people with the right skills.” 
• “People need the mindset, the personality, and the capabilities to really be able to collaborate. 
We don’t always have the right people in the key places to be able to collaborate.” 
 
Managers described the ideal collaborator as someone who possesses strong functional skills, 
sees the big picture, analyzes tradeoffs rigorously, executes with discipline, leads by example, 
and embraces change. Few managers who touch critical processes possess this skill set.  
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 One vice president at a global high-tech firm provided a meta-description of the 
challenge. He spent half an hour relating and emphasizing his firm’s supply chain talent crisis. 
He drew a picture depicting functional managers as spokes on a wheel and said,  
We can find great entry-level people, the ones with strong functional skills. But, finding 
people who can bring everyone together to work as a cohesive team is a real challenge. 
They’re just not out there. . . . This person in the middle (the hub) is missing. . . . 
Although the spokes are needed for the wheel to roll forward, the wheel falls apart 
without the hub. Hub managers possess a holistic vision and collaborative skills, but they 
are rare. 
 
He also explained that most “spoke” managers fail to evolve into “hub” managers on the job. 
Overall, managers emphasized that value co-creation will remain rare until managers are 
compelled to examine how their decisions and behavior influence larger value systems.  
 Ultimately, the Period 2 interviews reveled that as companies gained more collaborative 
experience, managers recognized that their firms have failed to build the talent needed to 
envision and execute collaboration strategies. Unfortunately, the problem is compounded by the 
interplay between organizational routines and individual skills. Without collaborative routines, as 
firms hire relationally inclined managers, existing decision-making processes stifle their 
collaborative tendencies. Managers either conform to the non-collaborative norm—or leave the 
company. Without collaborative thinkers, it is difficult to build enabling routines. A holistic 
approach to building organizational routines and individual skills is a prerequisite to achieving 
relational advantage.  
 
5. Relational Resistance and the Dynamics of Collaborative Transformation 
Among the interview firms, the intent to develop a relational capability began as a strategic 
response to an emergent opportunity or threat, which prompted managers to engage in 
collaboration strategies. Because collaborative behaviors are not the norm, managers described 
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the quest for relational rents as a transformation process. In each instance—regardless of the type 
of initiative observed—managers discussed the pain they felt as they met resistance to 
collaboration. Managers were perplexed that something that made so much sense on paper was 
so hard to do in daily practice.  
 Our interviews informed the underlying causes for the gap between desired and actual 
behavior—identifying not just the factors that impede the realization of relational rents but more 
importantly the intricate interactions that make mitigating their negative influence so difficult. 
Because systems diagrams depict dynamic transformations well (Senge, 2006), we employ 
systems diagramming conventions to illustrate the multiple, interactive reinforcing cycles that 
exist among the four types of relational resistors delineated in our typology (see Figure 3).  
*** Figure 3: A Socio-Structural View of Resistors to a Collaboration Capability *** 
 We first explicate the reinforcing cycles that exist among entrenched resistors. Firms are 
structured to inculcate deep functional skills and to seek economic efficiencies—both vital goals. 
Yet, the dark side of organizing for deep skills is that silo thinking grows and conflict emerges. 
Goals and metrics take on a local, short-term orientation, bolstering territoriality. Poor systems 
connectivity increases the bias toward non-collaborative behavior. Alone, each of these factors 
inhibits collaboration. When they exist together—as we typically found—they reinforce each 
other. For instance, local measures do not provide the process transparency needed to break 
down silo thinking. Managers noted this at several organizational levels, saying,  
• “We really do not have a metric that measures across the company.”  
• “We are still looking for measures that cross company boundaries.” 
• “There is no silver-bullet metric. We haven’t come across any metric that helps us measure 
end-to-end performance.” 
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Since managers do not understand broader interactions, they lack the insight and incentive to co-
create value. Metaphorically, structural resistors act as overlapping and reinforcing bricks in a 
wall of resistance that frustrates collaboration.  
 In the context of modern organizations, human behavior also resists collaboration. Most 
decision makers possess an innate desire to avoid vulnerability. Yet, because collaboration 
requires new skills—e.g., coaching, conflict resolution, team ideation, and trust building—it 
exacerbates the sense of vulnerability. Many managers intuitively realize that their skills are 
better suited to a power-based, transaction-oriented setting. They thus oppose change; i.e., the 
adoption of collaboration strategies. Scarce trust further hinders adoption. Managers do not trust 
others to forego opportunistic behavior and are prone to withhold emotional and financial 
investments in collaboration initiatives. The propensity to hoard sensitive information typifies 
this behavior. Managers fear that if they disclose sensitive information, they might give up a 
source of power or enable someone to take advantage of them. Independently, each of these 
sociological factors limits collaboration. Additionally, these resistant forces arise and reside 
together. Their interaction hinders efforts to isolate and treat the source of resistance, making 
sociological resistors resilient to mitigation efforts.  
 Whereas we described structural resistors as bricks in the wall of resistance, sociological 
resistors act as the mortar that holds the bricks in place. The reinforcing nature of sociological 
and structural resistors makes it difficult to bring down the wall of resistance. Specifically, 
almost every manager across both time periods described efforts to remove a single brick or to 
chip away at some of the mortar. Such efforts typically begin with investments in information 
technology or the establishment of cross-functional teams. Occasionally, companies launch 
major change initiatives. These efforts are resource intensive, requiring investments of capital, 
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time, and emotion. Yet, investments in technology often fail to recognize the sociological 
factors. Similarly, team-building efforts seldom encompass changes in measures. Likewise, 
change management programs may discuss territoriality, but they almost never address trust and 
they rarely alter structural impediments. As a result, efforts to cultivate a more collaborative 
environment seldom lower the height of the wall meaningfully.  
 Worse, as managers step back from their resistance-mitigation efforts to assess what steps 
might be taken next, it is not uncommon for someone else to come along and replace the bricks 
that have been chiseled free. Frustration naturally arises and, over time, cynicism toward 
collaboration strategies emerges. One manager summarized the dilemma, explaining, “We spend 
too much time putting out fires and not managing strategically to build robust, holistic 
processes.” Another manager described the consequences that follow, “We get awards for 
putting out fires and unfortunately, that is a recipe for mediocrity.”  
 We now address the reinforcing cycles among the emerging resistors. The interviews 
show the collaborative challenge does not end at the wall of resistance. Determined managers 
may eventually find a way to move an initiative beyond the wall of resistance. When they do, 
they inevitably find that the deeply embedded socio-structural resistors have suppressed the 
cultivation of needed organizational routines and managerial skills (the emerging resistors not 
widely perceived in the Period 1 interviews). Managers noted that only as their firms had 
persisted in pushing against the wall of resistance, did they begin to see they were missing key 
routines and skill sets. They described these skill-based resistors as stumbling blocks that raised 
costs and slowed progress toward effective collaboration.  
 We observed the following pattern. Collaborative champions leveraged personal 
persuasion and relationships to initiate collaboration strategies. After making the business case, 
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they employed pilot programs to document both the benefits of and the roadmap to successful 
collaboration. When it came time to extend these pockets of collaborative excellence, impetus 
was lost. Critical routines to manage relationship intensity, integrate processes, and mitigate the 
complexity’s downside were missing across the firm and among alliance partners. These routines 
are needed to identify complementary competencies and to make effective decisions regarding 
relationship-specific investments, knowledge sharing, and governance. Absent these 
organizational routines, supply chain collaboration does not deliver promised benefits. Managers 
misinterpreted the relational challenge and instead of redressing these routine-based resistors, 
they tended to invest in information systems to drive collaboration.  
 Socio-structural resistors not only limit the establishment of relational routines but also 
negatively influence an organization’s culture and its ability to nurture a collaborative workforce. 
One manager warned, “Some managers are tired of making suggestions only to be ignored. They 
express frustration—almost a loss of hope that they will be able to really make a difference.” 
Another manger lamented, “Truly committed people don't shut up; they just leave.” As the pool 
of collaborative talent is depleted, managers who remain lack either the desire or the ability to 
pursue a relational advantage. Managers portrayed collaboration strategies as emotionally 
draining. It is not uncommon for colleagues to describe champions of collaboration strategies as 
“tired” or “worn out.” Without supportive organizational routines to teach collaborative skills 
and instill appropriate behaviors, a small team of committed individuals must bear the weight of 
collaboration strategies. Thus, few people are willing to engage in removing the wall of 
resistance—further entrenching non-collaborative structures and behaviors.  
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
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Efforts to transform corporate strategy through the pursuit of new capabilities always engenders 
resistance. When the new capability requires substantive changes to organizational structures as 
well as investments in unfamiliar skills, the magnitude and breadth of resistance is strong. Jim 
Collins (2002) used the metaphor of a flywheel to illustrate a process of build up and 
breakthrough. Success comes only after managers persistently push on the flywheel to build 
momentum for transformation. With sufficient time, effort, and forward motion, the momentum 
of the flywheel begins to help rather than hinder progress.  
 Our findings reveal that relational resistors impede the buildup of momentum. That is, 
when managers are forced to scale the wall of resistance, they lose momentum for collaboration. 
Managers may keep pushing, but skill-based stumbling blocks once again undercut momentum. 
Finding their path impeded by an entrenched socio-structural wall of resistance and beset with 
stumbling blocks of inadequate organizational routines and individual skills, few firms achieve 
the momentum to escape non-collaborative structures and behaviors. As collaborative initiatives 
stall, they yield disappointing returns, which feeds cynicism. At some of our interview 
companies, failed efforts to remove the wall of resistance have actually made the wall more 
entrenched and immovable. 
 
6.1 Theoretical Contributions 
We contribute to the supply chain collaboration literature by not just creating a taxonomy of the 
impediments to collaboration but more precisely by showing how they work together to actively 
resist higher levels of collaboration and value co-creation. Understanding the interplay among 
the sociological and structural resistors is critical to explaining why collaboration strategies fail.  
 The socio-structural view delineates how organization design and human nature interact 
to not just impede collaboration but also hinder the development of organizational routines and 
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individual skills needed to transform pockets of collaborative success into a relational capability. 
Specifically, the socio-structural view explains that the way we design firms—that is, to achieve 
economic efficiencies and maximize short-run market valuation—creates structural resistors that 
impede collaboration strategies. Embedded in the organizational framework, structural resistors 
are hard to mitigate. The sociological make up of modern organizations further buttresses 
structural resistance. In other words, these two entrenched resistor types reinforce one another 
like bricks and mortar to form a formidable barrier to relational advantage. They also inhibit the 
emergence of essential organizational routines and individual skills, pushing relational advantage 
further out of reach.  
 More important than identifying and classifying resistor types, the socio-structural view 
shows how the distinct resistors are nested and interconnected. That is, socio-structural and skill-
based resistors never exist in isolation. Rather, they work together to obscure diagnosis, frustrate 
managerial remediation, and stall efforts to build momentum and migrate toward relational 
business models.  
 
6.2 Managerial Contributions 
By delving into the interplay and re-enforcing nature of relational resistors, the research explains 
why consistent relational rents are so difficult to realize. Individual resistors could be removed. 
Indeed, this focus on removing individual resistors is the approach pursued by most firms. 
However, the four types of resistors work together to freeze organizations in non-collaborative 
behavior. Understanding the intricate interactions among the relational resistors provides the 
insight needed for effective mitigation. Since no single, predominant resistor (e.g., inadequate 
technology) is responsible for the lack of progress toward collaborative strategy, no simple 
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response to resistor mitigation exists. Isolated initiatives (e.g., investing in technology and hiring 
consultants) are ill suited to the challenge posed by socio-structural resistors.  
 Although each of our interview companies has experienced relational failures, managers 
at the most collaborative companies are starting to comprehend that the mitigation challenge is 
one of accrual. One manager emphasized this point, saying, “You have to understand what you 
are up against. You need to understand all the different things that can kill you!” As such, a 
small, but increasing number of managers is beginning to realize that ad hoc mitigation strategies 
neither change organizational structure nor alleviate sociological stress points. Fragmented 
efforts are destined to disappoint, diluting resources and discouraging managers.  
 Investing in an effective relational architecture capable of mitigating socio-structural 
resistors requires a holistic and disciplined approach. Patience and persistence also precede the 
establishment of a relational capability. The good news: Because managers have experienced 
firsthand the difficulty inherent in changing the composition of their organizations and the skills 
of their employees, they are confident that strong relational capability will be a rare source of 
valuable, inimitable advantage. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Like all research, this research is subject to certain limitations. As inductive research, our 
findings may not be fully generalizable to companies across diverse industries, geographies, and 
channel settings. Future deductive research is needed to define better how the wall of resistance 
affects specific collaborative initiatives and relational performance. Further, by exploring the 
nature of and interaction among various resistors, we have not fully examined the composition 
and detail of each individual resistor.  
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 Future research is needed to investigate in greater detail the individual resistors and 
potential architectural remedies. However, by identifying and discussing four resistor types, we 
have provided a starting point for future researchers to evaluate the efficacy of diverse relational 
enablers. One goal of future research should be to develop a comprehensive, integrative theory of 
collaboration that links resistors and enablers to guide development of a proven path to 
distinctive collaboration. Research that yields such insight would help assure that more 
companies migrate from the vicious cycle of entrenched resistance to the virtuous cycle of 
relational advantage. 
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Table 1: Interviewed Company Demographics: Channel, Sales, Profits, and Employee Levels  
 Period 1 Period 2 
Channel Position Number Number 
 Retailer 14 15 
 Finished-goods Assembler 13 19 
 Direct-materials Supplier 13 12 
 Service Provider 9 11 
Descriptive Statistics Sales 
($M) 
Profits ($M)  
Employees 
Sales 
($M) 
Profits ($M)  
Employees 
 Mean $28,751 $1,704 124,706 $24,077 $2,168 94,408 
 Median $9,045 $589 44.750 $4,954 $679 16,300 
 Minimum $103 -$705 2,701 $3 -$4,183 35 
 Maximum $285,222 $10,267 1,700,000 $378,799 $12,731 2,100,000 
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Table 2: An Inventory of Relational Resistors: Period 1 versus Period 2 
Resistors P1 P2 Representative Proof Quotes 
Territoriality 73% 75% 
“This has led to turf battles between two groups;” “Functional silos and conflicting goals 
create high levels of turf protection;” “They don’t feel the impact of their own decisions” 
Strategic 
Misalignment 
53% 68% 
“We don’t see across the organization;” “Our structure is not prepared to share or change;” 
“No one knows what the whole thing looks like;” “We don’t have the same goals, structures or 
systems”  
Leadership 
Deficit 
39% 63% 
“Lack of leadership;” “Who is steering the ship?” “We need commitment at the top 
management level;” “Lack of decision-making at upper levels;” “Short-term thinking and 
tactical decision-making”  
Opposition to 
Change 
59% 61% 
“Change the mindset, ‘Because you always did it like that;’” “That’s the way we’ve always 
done it;” “Resistance to changed roles and responsibilities;” “Empowerment scares the hell 
out of top management” 
Low Trust 47% 53% 
“We are the two-ton gorilla and we wield tremendous leverage;” “Still legislates ‘trust’ via very 
tight contracts;” “Culture has reduced trust and collaboration;”  
Poor Systems 
Connectivity 
73% 53% 
“IT investment is inadequate;” “We have plenty of data, but we can’t get it to decision makers 
so they can use it;” “Information and technology systems are not as refined as they need to 
be”  
Information 
Hoarding 
73% 53% 
“Suppliers are frustrated that we do not share strategic information;” “They don’t do a good 
job of sharing information, but they still expect great service;” “Inadequate information sharing 
is huge;” “COMMUNICATION”  
Relationship 
Intensity 
12% 35% 
“Lack of buying power;” “Structuring contracts in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach;” “Most of our 
vendors lack the capabilities to collaborate effectively;” “Defining ‘partnering’ is a challenge”  
Complexity 
Management 
29% 33% 
“Customer forecasts are off by 50-100%;” “Complexity will be tomorrow’s constraint;” “Where 
does the handoff occur?” “. . . difficult to manage multiple systems”  
Process 
Integration 
10% 32% 
“Who really owns the responsibility?” “We are struggling to define our role;” “Resistance to the 
loss of power and to changed roles and responsibilities”  
Collaborative 
Skill Gap 
18% 30% 
“Perhaps the most difficult challenge is to find people with the right skills;” “We don’t have the 
talent we need for today;” “Employee development is a real challenge;” “Worker turnover and 
loss of talent”  
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Figure 1: Overview of Data Structure 
 
 
  
Structural 
Resistors 
Sociological 
Resistors 
Organizational 
Routines 
Individual 
Skills 
Process Integration 
Descriptions of poor process and role 
definition (e.g. someone else is responsible, 
that’s not my job, who owns the process?) 
Complexity Management 
Statements referring to complexity and 
ambiguity (e.g. “forecasts are garbage,” “we 
lack visibility”) 
Relationship Intensity 
Statements about buyer/supplier relationships 
(e.g. “we don’t know how to collaborate” 
”we’ve always had adversarial relationships” 
Statements about structure-induced conflict 
(e.g. “silo mentalities,” “protecting turf,” “cross-
functional conflict”) 
Territoriality 
Strategic Misalignment 
Statements about non-aligned objectives (e.g. 
balance between deliver/service, conflicting 
measures, long-versus-short-term outlook)  
Statements about linking systems (e.g. 
different systems/standards are used, IT 
investment is inadequate) 
Poor Systems Connectivity 
Opposition to Change 
Statements about fear of change (e.g. “That’s 
the way we’ve always done it,” “that won’t 
work here,” “that makes sense, but . . .”) 
Low Trust 
Statements about trust and power abuse (e.g. 
“they have all the power,” “You can’t 
trust . . . ,” “two ton gorilla,” “leverage”)  
Descriptions of lack of sharing among SC 
partners (e.g. customers/suppliers do not 
share information, ) 
Information Hoarding 
Leadership Deficit 
Statements referring to executive skills (e.g. 
“they are dinosaurs,” “leadership is modeling 
wrong behaviors.”) 
Collaborative Skill Gap 
Descriptions concerning education and HR 
skills (e.g. don’t have the talent, employee 
development is challenging, worker turnover) 
Emerging Resistors:  Embedded in Routines & Skills 
Entrenched Resistors: Embedded in Organizational Culture & Structure 
First-order Codes Theoretical Categories Theoretical Dimensions 
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of Relational Resistors 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A Socio-Structural View of Resistors to a Collaboration Capability 
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